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Richard Nixon’s trip to China in February 1972 marked a diplomatic 
breakthrough for Sino-American relations after two decades of mutual animosity since 
the Korean War. Nevertheless, the bilateral relations underwent a long stalemate in the 
mid-1970s, before the United States and China finally reached normalization of relations 
in December 1978. The scholarship on Sino-American relations in the 1970s tends to 
focus on Nixon’s visit or normalization of relations, without paying adequate attention to 
how Washington and Beijing dealt with the mid-decade deadlock. My report addresses 
this gap in the literature by analyzing the changing dynamism of Sino-American relations, 
determined first by Henry Kissinger and Mao Zedong, and later by Zbigniew Brzezinski 
and Deng Xiaoping. Kissinger sought to establish a triangular relationship with the Soviet 
Union and China, where the United States could manipulate the Sino-Soviet antagonism 
to improve its relations with both communist giants. With the failure of his initial idea of 
 v 
 
creating an anti-Soviet united front with Washington, Mao, through his Three World 
theory, championed the Third World struggle against both superpowers in competition 
for global hegemony in the disguise of détente. With Kissinger clinging to superpower 
détente and Mao determined to maintain a revolutionary China, their strategies were 
doomed to a stalemate. Unlike Kissinger, Brzezinski tried to create a bilateral structure, 
where the United States cooperated with China to confront the Soviet Union, which 
expanded its influence globally despite ongoing détente. Unlike Mao, Deng sought to 
replace revolution with development as China’s national agenda, by emphasizing 
modernization, instead of the Three World theory, in Chinese foreign policy. Their global 
strategies necessitated mutual cooperation, creating momentum for normalization 
negotiations, especially after Brzezinski’s trip to China in May 1978. The shifting 
dynamism in Sino-American relations from the Kissinger-Mao years to Brzezinski-Deng 
years, therefore, precipitated normalization of relations in the late 1970s. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Richard Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972 was “a week that changed the 
world.”1 With his national security adviser Henry Kissinger, he met Chairman Mao 
Zedong, negotiated with Premier Zhou Enlai, and concluded his trip with the Shanghai 
Communiqué, which symbolized Sino-American rapprochement after two decades of 
mutual animosity.2 Its statement that the United States and China opposed any attempt to 
seek hegemony in Asia, an implicit yet obvious warning against the Soviet Union, 
reshaped the Cold War paradigm by obscuring the ideological division line in 
international politics. The sensational public relations success of Nixon’s trip, however, 
left many critical issues unsolved, including the Taiwan problem, which resulted in a 
long stalemate in Sino-American relations in the following years. Notwithstanding the 
establishment of the Liaison Offices in Washington and Beijing in 1973 as a prelude for 
embassies,3  not until December 1978 did the United States and China manage to 
normalize relations, although they publicly and privately articulated a shared desire for 
normalization. Far from approaching normalization, they could barely sustain the status 
quo in the bilateral relationship when Gerald Ford visited China in December 1975. In 
                                                
1 Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Simon & Schuster Inc., 1978), 580.  
2 For the text of the Shanghai Communiqué, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: 
Richard Nixon, 1972 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), 376–379. 
3 Although it served as a backchannel channel to avoid interference from the State Department, Nixon 
emphasized that the USLO was “purely symbolic” and its importance was its “existence” because 
Kissinger, not director David Bruce, was to handle “important and sensitive issues” with China. 
Nelson D. Lankford, The Last American Aristocrat: The Biography of Ambassador David K. E. Bruce 
(Little, Brown and Company: Boston, 1996), Chapter 22. Nancy Tucker, China Confidential: 
American Diplomats and Sino-American Relations (Columbia University Press: New York, 2001), 
293. Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1969-1976, Vol. XVIII, Document 30.  
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contrast to the much celebrated Shanghai Communiqué, press secretary Ron Nessen 
described Ford’s trip as “more a matter of atmosphere than of substance,”4 a testament of 
U.S. and Chinese inability to reach agreements not only on Taiwan but also on broad 
strategic topics. Washington and Beijing could finally embark on the normalization 
negotiations when new momentum emerged under the new leaderships in both countries. 
Although political scientists and journalists have produced extensive narratives on 
Sino-American relations in the 1970s,5 historians are now beginning to utilize newly 
available sources to explore the long process from rapprochement to normalization. The 
2009 volume of Diplomatic History, for example, hosted a special forum entitled 
“Transforming the Cold War: The United States and China, 1969-1980,” where three 
scholars discussed various aspects of normalization. Enrico Fardella focused on China’s 
security concern over Vietnam and Deng’s political struggle to explain China’s 
compromises on the Taiwan issue. Breck Walker reevaluated Cyrus Vance’s often-
                                                
4 New York Times, December 4, 1975. 
5 Robert Ross used the negotiation theories to illuminate how the changing perceptions of relative 
balance of power between the Untied States and China affected the normalization process. Rosemary 
Foot adopted the constructivist theories in investigating the impact of a new U.S. view of China as 
neither menacing nor powerful in the 1960s on the various aspects of Sino-American relations in the 
following decade. James Mann utilized archival sources, secondary materials, and oral interviews to 
show how Sino-American relations evolved on a series of misunderstandings and misperceptions 
since rapprochement. Patrick Tyler wrote a more detailed, albeit less analytical, narrative of the 
bilateral relationship during the same time period as Mann’s account through thorough archival 
research. Combined together, these works, though published more than fifteen years ago, offer 
overviews of Sino-American relations in the 1970s with considerable theoretical depth and factual 
accuracy. See Robert Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969-1989 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), Rosemary Foot, Practice of Power: U.S. Relations with 
China since 1949 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), James Mann, About Face: A History of America's 
Curious Relationship with China from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Random House, 1998), and 
Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China (New York: Public Affairs, 1999). 
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overlooked strategy for normalization with China. Brian Hilton illuminated the role of 
Jimmy Carter’s vision for global stability in his decision to normalize relations with 
Beijing and severe relations with Taipei. 6  Their works made groundbreaking 
contributions to the scholarship on Sino-American relations in the 1970s, which tended to 
concentrate on Nixon’s trip and left its aftermath understudied.7 However, no scholar has 
analyzed the decade as a whole to elucidate the shifting dynamisms in the Sino-American 
relations from the deadlock in the mid-1970s to the breakthrough in the late 1970s. This 
paper intends to fill this gap in the literature by conducting a comprehensive examination 
of how Washington and Beijing successfully overcame the deadlock and normalized 
relations. 
This paper examines currently available U.S. and Chinese materials. For U.S. 
sources, it utilizes the recently published volumes of the Foreign Relations of the United 
                                                
6 Enrico Fardella, “The Sino-American Normalization: A Reassessment,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 33, 
No. 4 (September 2009), 545-578. Breck Walker, “‘Friends, But Not Allies’—Cyrus Vance and the 
Normalization of Relations with China,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 33, No. 4 (September 2009), 579-
594. Brian Hilton, “‘Maximum Flexibility for Peaceful Change’: Jimmy Carter, Taiwan, and the 
Recognition of the People’s Republic of China,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 33, No. 4 (September 2009), 
595-613. 
7 Recent works on Nixon’s visit to China include: Gong Li, “Chinese Decision Making and the 
Thawing of U.S.-China Relations” and Michael Schaller, “Détente and the Strategic Triangle: Or 
‘Drinking Your Mao Tai and Having Your Vodka, Too’” in Robert Ross and Jiang Changbin, eds., 
Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2001). Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2001), Chapter 9. Evelyn Goh, Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 
1961-1974: From “Red Menace” to “Tacit Ally” (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
Chapter 5-9. Margaret MacMillan, Nixon and Mao (New York: Random House, 2007) Yukinori 
Komine, Secrecy in US Foreign Policy: Nixon, Kissinger and the Rapprochement with China 
(Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publisher, 2008) Yafeng Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China 
Talks during the Cold War, 1949-1972 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), Chapter 6-8. 
Chris Tudda, A Cold War Turning Point: Nixon and China, 1969-1972 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
University Press, 2012). 
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States as well as memoirs and oral history records, which enable detailed analysis of the 
decision-making processes during the Nixon, Ford, and Carter Administrations. Unlike a 
large part of the historiography, it also examines Chinese sources, most notably compiled 
manuscripts of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. In addition, it benefits from recently 
published memoirs and biographies of Chinese diplomats, such as Foreign Minister 
Huang Hua and chief of Chinese Liaison Office Zhai Zemin, who were involved in 
normalization negotiations. Furthermore, it consults secondary narratives written by 
Chinese historians with access to a wide range of underused documents, while paying 
attention to their bias toward the official historical interpretations. By examining these 
multi-language sources, this paper aims to illuminate concurrences and discrepancies 
between American and Chinese strategic visions, instead of the minute details of 
negotiations. 
This paper particularly focuses on the impact of the changes of policy architects—
from Henry Kissinger to Zbigniew Brzezinski in the United States and from Mao Zedong 
to Deng Xiaoping in China—on the dynamism of Sino-American relations. On one hand, 
Kissinger’s strategy aimed at exploiting Beijing’s insecurity vis-à-vis Moscow to draw it 
closer to Washington, which would in turn force Moscow to compromise on arms control 
negotiations. On the other hand, despite his pragmatism in diplomacy, Mao redefined 
China’s revolutionary identity through the Three Worlds theory, which championed the 
developing world against the superpowers. Kissinger’s and Mao’s strategies, therefore, 
left little, if any, room for normalization. Their successors, however, changed this 
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paradigm. Determined to counter Soviet activities in the Third World, Brzezinski sought 
to construct a de facto alliance with Beijing against Moscow, instead of racing them 
toward Washington in the triangular relationship. Using cooperation with the United 
States as leverage to transcend the Maoist legacy of his heir, Hua Guofeng, and set 
modernization as China’s new agenda, Deng reoriented its diplomacy from revolution to 
development. The leadership change in the United States and China, therefore, provided 
both countries with a shared strategic priority in normalization for the first time since 
they embarked on building a new relationship with Nixon’s 1972 trip.  
 
  
 6 
 
Chapter 2: Kissinger’s Triangular Strategy 
Nixon and Kissinger saw China as one of their foreign policy priorities from the 
beginning of their administration. The president ordered a NSC study “exploring 
possibilities of rapprochement [sic] with the Chinese” soon after inauguration based on 
his philosophical conviction after extensive foreign trips from 1962 to 1967 that the 
United States “simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of 
nations.”8 Washington should persuade Beijing that “it must change” because there was 
“no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in 
angry isolation.”9 Kissinger soon supported Nixon’s idea of engaging with China, though 
from a more strategic standpoint. Frustrated by the superpower oligopoly of international 
politics, which enhanced the danger of a nuclear showdown, the national security adviser 
envisioned the triangular relationship between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing to 
facilitate a “rebalancing of the global equilibrium” by providing “flexibility for 
innovative diplomacy and consensus-building, rather than the enforced dominance of two 
bullies.” As the relative decline of U.S. power due to the Vietnam War and the relative 
rise of Soviet power due to its nuclear buildup compelled Washington to negotiate 
“balance of power” with Moscow, he intended the China opening to improve U.S. 
diplomatic leverage in superpower negotiations on global issues, especially arms control. 
Kissinger thus thought of Sino-American rapprochement as a diplomatic tool to make the 
                                                
8 Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1969-1976, Volume XVII, 1969-1972, 
Document 3. 
9 Richard Nixon, “Asia After Vietnam,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 1 (October 1967), 111-25. 
Emphasis in original. 
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Soviet Union “more malleable” and help the United States “overcome the trauma of 
Vietnam.”10 
Kissinger’s triangular diplomacy was predicated upon Beijing’s insecurity vis-à-
vis Moscow. With the United States withdrawing from Vietnam and the Soviet Union 
intimidating China with its nuclear forces, Moscow superseded Washington as Beijing’s 
primary enemy. Kissinger extrapolated that when China feared the Soviet Union than the 
United States, its “self-interest” would “impel it to cooperate with the United States.”11 
As early as mid-1969, he concluded that Beijing would ultimately moderate its 
antagonistic attitude, “seeking improved relations with the U.S. and/or Japan, in part as a 
counter-balance to Soviet pressures.”12 Despite contradicting remarks of Chinese officials, 
Kissinger’s conviction of China’s fear of the Soviet Union deepened as the bilateral 
negotiations proceeded in secrecy. Kissinger reported to Nixon on his return from China 
in October 1971 that although the Chinese tried to “downgrade the Russian factor,” “their 
dislike and concern” was “obvious.”13 As Nixon’s trip approached, he even surmised that 
Beijing would drop its ideological claims, especially on Taiwan, out of its fear of 
Moscow. Kissinger emphasized to Nixon on the eve of his departure that the Chinese 
would be “firm on principle but willing to be flexible on details” about Taiwan because 
they needed the United States “because of a threatening Soviet Union.”14 Despite his 
                                                
10 Kissinger, Diplomacy, 730. 
11 Kissinger, Diplomacy, 729. 
12 FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, Document 23. 
13 National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book (hereafter NSAEBB) No. 70, Document 20. 
14 NSAEBB No. 70, Document 27. 
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failure to soften the language in the Shanghai Communiqué, which largely recognized 
Chinese claims on Taiwan, Kissinger maintained that Zhou “left no doubt that he feared 
Soviet expansionism above all.”15 
As a corollary to his conviction of China’s need of U.S. security guarantee, 
Kissinger underestimated China’s sensitivity to the Taiwan problem from the onset of 
bilateral negotiations. Despite Zhou’s depiction of “the U.S. occupation of Taiwan” as 
“only one outstanding issue between us” in early 1971, he underplayed it as “a standard 
formula,” as China was “interested above all in the Soviet challenge.” He anticipated that 
the Chinese would not insist on U.S. withdrawal from Asia because they “desperately 
wanted us in Asia as a counterweight to the Soviet Union.” 16  Although Zhou 
reemphasized in May that “the first question to be settled” was “the question of the 
concrete way of the withdrawal of all the U.S. Armed Forces from Taiwan and Taiwan 
Straits area,” Kissinger took the omission of the defense treaty as an indication that China 
would allow the United States to sustain diplomatic relations with Taiwan. 17  His 
optimism, however, proved to be groundless in initial negotiations with Zhou, who 
demanded Kissinger to “recognize the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China 
and not make any exceptions” in a joint communiqué.18 Kissinger’s emphasis on Soviet 
threat failed to alleviate Zhou’s stubbornness on the status of Taiwan, although he could 
settle with an ambiguous phrase “All Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain 
                                                
15 Kissinger, White House Years, 1073. 
16 NSAEBB No. 66, Document 9. Kissinger, White House Years, 701, 702, 705. 
17 NSAEBB No. 66, Document 26. Kissinger, White House Years, 727. 
18 NSAEBB No. 66, Document 34. 
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there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.” To be accurate, Kissinger 
understood from his first contact with the Chinese that he could do “little more than 
damage limitation by reaffirming our diplomatic relations and mutual defense treaty” in 
the face of Chinese intransigency.19 Nonetheless, he dismissed the Taiwan language in 
the communiqué as rhetorical and concluded that the “overwhelming impression” of 
Zhou and Mao was that “continuing differences over Taiwan were secondary to our 
primary mutual concern over the international equilibrium.”20 Kissinger’s optimism on 
the Taiwan problem reached its height in January 1973, when the Paris Peace Treaty 
finally ended the Vietnam War, thereby removing the geopolitical bottleneck to 
normalization. An elated Kissinger told Nixon that although Sino-American 
normalization would eventually necessitate a nullification of the defense treaty, China 
regarded Taiwan as “subsidiary” compared to its imminent desire for “protection against 
Russia.”21 
Based on these assumptions, Kissinger started to race Moscow and Beijing for a 
closer tie with Washington after the announcement of Nixon’s trip in July 1971. While 
promoting détente with the Soviet Union, he sought to take advantage of China’s 
perceived insecurity in order to persuade it to improve its relationship with the United 
                                                
19 NSAEBB No. 66, Document 40. 
20 Kissinger, White House Years, 1074. Though stipulating the future U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan, 
the Shanghai Communiqué meant no more than a “beginning of a long process” that he would not 
have to solve immediately. William Burr, ed., The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks With 
Beijing and Moscow (New York: The New Press, 1988), 40-43, “Memorandum of Conversation, Top 
Secret,” December 13, 1971. 
21 FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XXVIII, Document 5. 
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States. On one hand, he shared details of U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations with the 
Chinese in the hope of alleviating their animosity toward U.S.-Soviet cooperation. On the 
other hand, he attempted to deepen their concern that Washington “might find Peking 
expendable” after achieving “our objective with Moscow,” namely the SLAT 
Agreement.22 Having secured the summit in Moscow, Kissinger warned Zhou in October 
1971 that a U.S. “settlement with the Soviet Union” would have “the objective 
consequences of increasing your problem” because it would ”free itself in Europe so it 
can concentrate on other areas,” namely China.23 In January 1972, in the wake of the 
Indian-Pakistan war, Deputy National Security Adviser Alexander Haig also suggested to 
Zhou that the Soviet Union sought to “encircle the PRC with unfriendly states,” trying 
“first to neutralize the People’s Republic and then turn on us.”24 Moreover, Kissinger 
expected the Moscow summit in May 1972 to “shake them [the Chinese] up” even 
further.25 Kissinger reiterated to Zhou in June that the “objective consequence” of the 
superpower summit was “to free Soviet policy for a greater role in Asia by producing 
relaxation in Europe,” while the United States would nonetheless “oppose Soviet 
adventures in Asia, and in particular pressures that might be directed against the People’s 
Republic.”26 In February 1973, when the signing of the Prevention of Nuclear War 
(PNW) Agreement was approaching, Kissinger further highlighted Soviet “hegemonial 
                                                
22 Kissinger, White House Years, 763. 
23 NSAEBB No. 66, Document 13. 
24 NSAEBB No. 70, Document 24. 
25 FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, Document 222, footnote 5. 
26 FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-13, Document 139. 
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[sic] aspirations” toward the “whole Asia-Pacific region” and Europe’s “peaceful 
illusion,” which enabled the Soviet Union to aim at “the East.” 27  These remarks 
illuminate Kissinger’s bargaining tactics to utilize Soviet malign intentions to move 
Beijing closer to Washington, which would in turn urge Moscow to make concessions in 
arms control negotiations. 
These pillars of Kissinger’s triangular strategy—a conviction of Chinese fear of 
the Soviet Union, exploitation of it to draw China closer to the United States, and 
dismissal of Taiwan as a secondary issue—evolved through rapprochement negotiations 
and functioned well until mid-1973. Stunned by Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing, the 
Soviet Union agreed on the summit date in April 1972 after long procrastination.28 
Likewise, distressed by Soviet assistance to India and its invasion of East Pakistan in 
December 1971, China refrained from postponing Nixon’s visit despite U.S. bombing of 
North Vietnam, contrary to its decision to cancel Kissinger’s visit in August 1973 due to 
mounting tension in Cambodia. Positioned at the most advantageous point of the strategic 
triangle, Washington, therefore, successfully urged Moscow and Beijing to compete for 
its favor, which resulted in the SALT Agreement and the Shanghai Communiqué. 
Détente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with China developed hand in hand 
further into early 1973, when Washington and Beijing declared in their joint statement 
                                                
27 FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVIII, Document 5. 
28 A few days after Nixon’s announcement of his future trip to China, Soviet ambassador Anatoly 
Dobrynin even asked Kissinger if Soviet indecisiveness on the summit facilitated his secret trip. FRUS, 
1969-1976, Vol. XIII, Document 288. 
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that the time had come for “accelerating the normalization of relations.”29 Kissinger even 
stated to Nixon that with the “Soviet threat growing, the Vietnam War over and age 
crowding the Chinese leadership,” the United States and China had “now become tacit 
allies.”30 Nonetheless, contrary to Kissinger’s assertion that China was “closest to us in its 
global perceptions,”31 the Chinese chairman had different ideas. 
 
  
                                                
29 New York Times, February 23, 1973. 
30 FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVIII, Document 18. 
31 FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVIII, Document 19. 
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Chapter 3: Mao’s Revolutionary Strategy 
Mao’s changing policy toward the United States reflected China’s domestic and 
foreign challenges in the late 1960s. Internally, he sought to correct the excesses of the 
Cultural Revolution, which jeopardized China’s social order, by de-radicalizing domestic 
politics.32 Externally, the Sino-Soviet border clash convinced Mao of the need to put 
aside ideological differences and pursue a conciliatory approach toward the United States 
in order to cope with Soviet nuclear threat.33 As many scholars pointed out, the domestic 
and international realities forced the chairman to suppress his revolutionary impetus 
while accentuating geopolitical realism in Chinese foreign policy.34 Nonetheless, Mao, in 
fact, never abandoned his revolutionary ideal until his death. Far from admitting China’s 
vulnerabilities, he described Sino-American rapprochement as the ultimate success of his 
long-term struggle against U.S. imperialists. In his view, the decline of U.S. hegemony, 
exemplified by the quagmire in Vietnam and the ejection of Taiwan from the United 
Nations, compelled Nixon to come to China.35 Upon hearing Nixon’s triumphant remark 
that his trip to China changed the world, Mao satirically observed, “I think the world 
                                                
32 See Jian Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 2001), Jeremi Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2007). 
33 Yang Kuisong, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American 
Rapprochement,” Cold War History, 1.1 (August 2000), 21-52. 
34 See, for example, Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York, 1994), chapter 28. Robert Ross, 
Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969–1989 (Stan- ford, CA 1995), chapter 1. 
John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1993), 
74–81. 
35 Jin Chongji, Zhou Enlai zhuan (Beijing: Zhonggong wenxian chubanshe, 2008), 1851-52. 
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changed him.” 36  The chairman, therefore, achieved Sino-American rapprochement 
without fundamentally altering his worldview and tried to shape post-Cultural Revolution 
China on the basis of his revolutionary ideal. 
Mao’s growing antagonism toward Soviet global adventurism underlay China’s 
foreign policy after Nixon’s visit. While dismissing détente as “impossible” because the 
superpowers were “compelled to go forward with arms race,”37 Beijing attempted to 
create a global anti-Soviet alliance. In February 1973, he urged Kissinger to forge “a 
horizontal line,” consisting of the United States, Japan, China, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and 
Western Europe, to “commonly deal with a bastard [the Soviet Union].”38 Mao, in 
essence, used the possibility of Sino-American alliance to persuade Kissinger to limit 
détente and assume the responsibility of global containment of the Soviet Union, with 
China defending the Asian flank. The Foreign Ministry internally justified this new 
strategy by insisting that an improved relationship with Washington, while upholding its 
principles on Taiwan, would “benefit the struggle against the Soviet revisionists.”39 
Citing Mao at the Tenth National Congress in late August, Zhou further advocated 
aligning with the United States as “necessary compromise” of “a revolutionary nation.”40 
There was, however, a caveat to the chairman’s idea of an anti-Soviet alliance with the 
                                                
36 Hua Huang, Qinli yu jianwen: Huang Hua huiyilu (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2008), 167. 
37 FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, Document 231. 
38 FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVIII, Document 12. 
39 Foreign Ministry, Waijiao Tongbao, 12, February 24, 1973, cited in Gong Li, “Tongxiang jianjiao 
zhi lu de jiannan bashe—1972-1978 nian de zhongguo duimei zhengce,” Party Literature, No 2, 2002, 
70. 
40 People’s Daily, September 1, 1973. 
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Untied States: it derived from his theory of “utilizing contradiction and defeating [the 
enemies] one by one.” In other words, it aimed at cooperating with the lesser evil to 
defeat the greater evil, while continuing to oppose both superpowers for their ambition 
for hegemony. As Yang Kuisong and Xia Yafeng pointed out, the revolutionary rhetoric 
that the chairman mobilized to promote the new strategy was not “empty cannons” but “a 
true reflection of Mao’s psyche.”41 Mao’s geopolitical pragmatism, therefore, coexisted 
with his revolutionary vision. 
Nevertheless, Mao’s idea to form a global anti-Soviet alliance turned out to be 
short-lived. As it became clear that Washington would not prioritize its relationship with 
Beijing to that with Moscow, the chairman gradually yet resolutely kept a distance from 
the United States and turned to his long-time ideal of an international united front. The 
Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement in June 1973 was the turning point: the Chinese 
denounced the agreement as “out-and-out domination by the two world powers” to 
“monopolize nuclear weapons, maintaining nuclear superiority and make nuclear threats” 
against weaker countries to “force them into spheres of influence of either this or that 
hegemony” so that the “two hegemonies may have a free hand in dividing up the 
world.”42 Mao’s talk with Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda late February 1974, where 
he first laid out the Three Worlds Theory, symbolized his abandonment of the “horizontal 
line.” The chairman categorized the United States and the Soviet Union as “the First 
                                                
41 Yang Kuisong and Xia Yafeng, “Vacillating between Revolution and Détente,” Diplomatic History, 
Vol. 34, No. 2 (April, 2010), 410, 412. 
42 FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-13, Document 148, Vol. XVIII, Document 36. 
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World” with numerous nuclear weapons and great wealth, their allies as “the Second 
World” with fewer nuclear weapons and wealth, and the rest as “the Third World” with 
few nuclear weapons and little wealth. 43  Deng Xiaoping elaborated on the new 
revolutionary theory in his speech at the U.N. General Assembly in April 1974. He 
declared that the superpower hegemonic competition in disguise of détente “extends over 
the entire globe,” arousing “strong resistance among the Third World.” As a member of 
the Third World, China would always support the struggle of “the oppressed peoples and 
oppressed nations” as “our bounden internationalist duty.”44 Contrary to the “horizontal 
line,” Mao now put the two superpowers in the same category, against which China 
should form an international united front. 
As Yang and Xia pointed out, the Three Worlds Theory indicated a certain degree 
of retreat from the radical discourse during the height of the Cultural Revolution. Faced 
with the apparent impossibility of worldwide revolution in the aftermath of Sino-
American rapprochement, Mao replaced “class struggle” with “interstate relations” in his 
analytical framework of the world situation due to “pragmatic considerations” of 
“national security.” “Chinese foreign policy,” they argued, “started to move further and 
further away from a foreign policy dominated by revolutionary ideology.”45 However, the 
Three Worlds Theory still revealed the chairman’s persisting revolutionary zeal, most 
notably his vocal insistence on the “great disorder under heaven.” As Deng argued in his 
                                                
43 Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan (Beijing: Zhongyang 
wenxian chubanshe, Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1994), 600-601. 
44 New York Times, April 12, 1974. 
45 Yang and Xia, “Vacillating between Revolution and Détente,” 420-22. 
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U.N. speech, “revolution” continued to be “the main trend in the world today,” and 
“people of all countries must get prepared” for “the danger of a new world war” because 
détente was “nothing but an empty talk” to conceal the “irreconcilable” contradiction 
between the superpowers. Mao himself started to emphasize the inevitability of a 
superpower war in December 1973, when he declared in a Politburo meeting, “Prepare 
for war! Internal and external wars will both come! I can still fight a few wars.” War 
would result from the demise of détente, as the chairman told Tanzanian President Julius 
Nyerere in March 1974, “I am afraid it [arms limitation] is a bit difficult. In short, this 
world is unstable… They talk about peace now, but it may lead to another war.” Mao also 
told Ex-President Nixon in February 1976, “The United States has interests to protect in 
the world. The Soviet Union wants to expand. This is impossible to change. In the era 
where class exists, war is a phenomena between two peace.”46 These remarks attest to 
Mao’s apocalyptic vision: the ultimate collapse of the superpower détente due to their 
inherent desire for hegemony would precipitate a war with catastrophic consequences to 
the whole world. China should thus expose the deceitful nature of their peaceful gestures 
and unite the Third World in preparation for the doomsday. To be sure, Mao could not 
reinstate the ultra-left rhetoric of worldwide revolution, which would disrupt the political 
stability at home and isolate China abroad. Nevertheless, the chairman remained 
passionate for his revolutionary pursuit to the maximum extent possible within the limit 
of practical considerations. 
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Mao’s shift from the “horizontal line” to the Three Worlds Theory had domestic 
repercussions. First, the failure of a “horizontal line” was accompanied by political attack 
on Zhou in late 1973. Mao started to alienate the premier when he criticized the Foreign 
Ministry report in June 1973, which characterized the PNW Agreement as “a stronger 
atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet domination.”47 The chairman complained to Zhang Chunqiao 
and Wang Hongwen, two Politburo members who would soon form the Gang of Four, 
that the “unsatisfactory” report focused on “the superficial,” namely the superpower 
collusion, while ignoring “the essence,” that is, “great chaos, great disintegration, and 
great reshuffle” due to the superpower competition.48 Mao further reprimanded Zhou for 
his failure to reject Kissinger’s proposal to establish “a hot line” and share military 
intelligence on Soviet troops in November 1973.49 With his confidence in U.S. intentions 
rapidly fading, the chairman warned that China “should not form a military alliance with 
the United States.”50 He also instructed Zhou to hold a Politburo meeting from late 
November to mid-December, where Jiang Qing, Mao’s wife, denounced him as “right-
wing capitulationist” willing to compromise with the Americans. Mao expressed his 
satisfaction with Zhou’s public disgrace as a result of political crackdown, which, to a 
certain degree, reflected his grudge against the premier’s international prestige.51 More 
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important, however, the infeasibility of a “horizontal line” compelled the chairman to 
distance China from the Untied States so that he could attack both superpowers for their 
hegemonic competition. He now had to discredit Zhou, an embodiment of conciliatory 
policy toward the United States, at home before promoting the Three Worlds Theory 
abroad. Mao’s new revolutionary strategy, therefore, played a far more decisive role in 
precipitating Zhou’s downfall than his personal envy.  
Second, the ideological scope of the Three Worlds Theory shaped Mao’s political 
maneuvers in from late 1973 to late 1975. On the one hand, recognizing that China could 
not afford another Cultural Revolution, he kept the Gang of Four in check. Mao 
suffocated the radicals’ schemes to gain the political upper hand on the moderates, 
especially Zhou and Deng, including the attempted Eleventh Two-Line Struggle in 
December 1973, the Criticize Ling, Criticize Confucius Campaign throughout 1974, the 
Fengqing Ship Incident in October 1974, the Anti-Empiricism Campaign in March 1975, 
and the Criticize Shuihu Campaign in August 1975. He criticized Jiang for forming “a 
small sect of four” and her “own government (becoming a shadow president)” out of 
“thirst” for chairmanship. The chairman even demanded his wife to submit a self-
criticism on her political ambition for the Fourth National People’s Congress in January 
1975, where she failed to place his political allies in key party positions.52 On the other 
hand, Mao steadily promoted Deng since his restoration in early 1973 after the purge 
during the height of Cultural Revolution, because he served the chairman’s political 
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purposes. Deng could restore stability and unity in Chinese politics without exposing 
himself to the Gang of Four’s political attack, as he was not connected with disgraced 
figures such as Liu Xiaoqi and Lin Biao. In addition, he could also help promote Mao’s 
new revolutionary strategy abroad after Zhou’s downfall.53 The chairman, therefore, not 
only gave him significant party positions, varying from a Politburo membership to the 
First Vice Premiership, but also designated him as Zhou’s successor as China’s chief 
diplomat. Symbolically, he sent Deng to the U.N. General Assembly in April 1974 as a 
spokesperson of his Three Worlds Theory despite Jiang’s opposition. 54  With clear 
backing from Mao, Deng, in cooperation with growingly feeble Zhou, promoted his 
ambitious modernization agendas for various fields in 1975, including agriculture, 
industry, military, literature, and education.55 Nevertheless, Deng’s growing emphasis on 
development, which put revolution on the backburner, antagonized Mao, who remained 
unwilling to abandon China’s revolutionary identity. The debate on the legacy of the 
Cultural Revolution loomed as the critical issue in late 1975. The aging chairman urged 
Deng to support his view of the Cultural Revolution as “seven-tenths right and three-
tenths wrong” or “basically accurate and fair.” When he equivocally rejected to issue a 
pro-Cultural Revolution resolution in mid-November, Deng lost Mao’s support, which 
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led to the Criticize Deng Campaign in December and his third purge in April 1976.56 
Although Mao protected Deng from the Gang of Four at first in an attempt to de-
radicalize domestic politics, the chairman nonetheless never hesitated to abandon Deng 
when his modernization programs came to threaten China’s revolutionary identity. Mao, 
in other words, chose to sacrifice China’s political stability and economic development 
for his lifelong loyalty for the revolutionary cause. 
Mao’s foreign and domestic policy from Sino-American rapprochement to his 
death shows his unyielding will to make China an active creator of the revolutionary 
world order, instead of a passive reactor in the triangular relationship. Internationally, he 
promulgated the Three Worlds Theory in hope to enhance China’s global leadership in 
navigating the “great disorder under heaven.” American scholar William Kintner best 
summarized the chairman’s ideological worldview in early 1976: “the Chinese strategy 
for achieving global ascendancy” was aimed at “mobilizing the Third World” against 
both “the capitalist-imperialist power” and “the social-revisionist power” in preparation 
for “the ultimate conflict” between them.57 At home, Mao manipulated the political 
rivalry between Deng and the Gang of Four to pursue revolutionary foreign policy 
without domestic chaos. However, he eventually tilted the political balance in favor of 
the radicals when Deng’s critical attitude toward the legacy of the Cultural Revolution, 
prioritization of economic construction over class struggle, and acceptance material 
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wealth in socialism nonetheless jeopardized Mao’s ideals. In this sense, the temporary 
halt on Deng’s modernization programs was “an inevitable tragedy” for “the CCP and 
Chinese people,” as Zhongyuan Cheng and Xia Xingzhen put it.58 Though constrained by 
pragmatic considerations, Mao’s China, in short, remained a revolutionary China. 
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Chapter 4: Kissinger-Mao Stalemate 
Although Kissinger saw no obstacle for normalization in November 1973, when 
he observed “the close identity between you [Nixon] and the Chinese leaders’ strategic 
perspectives,”59 the inherent contradiction deepened between his triangular strategy and 
Mao’s revolutionary strategy. With U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations developing, 
Kissinger had to alleviate Beijing’s accusation that Washington sought to “reach out to 
the Soviet Union by standing on Chinese shoulders,” a scathing analogy of U.S. 
exploitation of China as leverage to negotiate with the Soviet Union.60 To this end, he 
made numerous attempts to maintain the momentum for normalization by reinforcing the 
existing tactics of demonizing the Soviet Union to draw China closer to the United States. 
In June 1973, Kissinger confided Leonid Brezhnev’s “formal and more explicit proposal” 
for joint sabotage of China’s growing nuclear capabilities to Huang Zhen, the chief of the 
Chinese Liaison Office. He noted that the Russians were “more brazen and brutal than I 
would have thought possible.” 61 Against this backdrop, Kissinger proposed to set up “a 
hot line” and share intelligence information on Soviet forces in November, a tantamount 
to a quasi-military alliance.62 In addition, he warned Huang in July 1974 of another secret 
Soviet proposal for “a treaty of friendship and cooperation to go to each other’s 
assistance if either was attacked by a third party,” which he claimed was targeted at 
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China.63 Furthermore, he informed Deng in November of another Soviet proposal to 
prevent Beijing and Tokyo from “becoming too close,” another Soviet ploy to isolate 
China in Asia.64 In countless other occasions, Kissinger repeatedly emphasized Soviet 
antagonism against China to stimulate its sense of insecurity vis-à-vis the “polar bear.” 
Nonetheless, Kissinger’s tactics failed, as China became less and less concerned 
about Soviet threat. First, the possibility of Soviet invasion had significantly diminished 
since the Sino-Soviet border clash in 1969. The CIA predicted in November 1973 that a 
possibility of Soviet preemptive attack on China was “quite low, say on the order of 1 in 
10.”65 They concluded that although Sino-Soviet rapprochement was “highly unlikely” 
through 1980, a war was also improbable, which might make China “less interested in 
improving relations with the US.”66 To validate these studies, Deng pointed out that 
Soviet troops were “scattered” over the long border and thus impossible to invade 
China.67 Mao also complained to former British Prime Minister Edward Heath, “They 
[the Soviet Union] have only few soldiers, but you Europeans fear them so much!”68 
Second, to counter Kissinger’s warning on Soviet ambition in Asia, the Chinese 
maintained that Moscow was “making a feint to attach the West.” “The Soviet Union 
only says it will attack China,” he averred to French Foreign Minister Maurice Shuman in 
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July 1972, “but in reality it wants to engulf Europe.”69 The chairman also told Belgian 
Prime Minister Leo Tindemans that the Soviet Union would “not dare invade China now” 
because its “main strategic focus is on Europe and the Middle East.”70 Kissinger’s 
attempts to convince the Chinese otherwise all failed, as they insisted on Moscow’s 
hidden ambition in Europe as a “point of major importance.”71 
As discussed above, Mao did indeed anticipate a war; nonetheless, it would occur 
only when the Soviet Union neutralized Europe through détente. The Chinese thus 
became increasingly critical of U.S. conciliatory policy toward the Russians, which they 
believed assisted Soviet design for global hegemony. Chinese antagonism reached its 
peak in October 1975, three months after the Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe in Helsinki, when Deng called the conference “European Insecurity Conference” 
and analogized it to the infamous Munich Appeasement. He maintained that the Soviet 
Union had “two big weaknesses,” namely the shortage of food grains and the industrial 
and technological backwardness, which would compromise Soviet war capabilities 
despite its military might. Deng criticized the United States for covering, instead of 
capitalizing on, their weaknesses through détente, thereby expediting the arrival of war. 
To repudiate Kissinger’s emphasis on China’s insecurity and need to stay close to the 
United States, Deng declared that it “fears nothing under heaven or on earth” and “will 
not ask favors from anyone,” especially “nuclear protection [by other countries].” 
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Countering the argument that China was “afraid of an attack by the Russians,” he 
asserted, “As a friend, I will be candid and tell you that this assessment is wrong.”72 Deng 
thus maintained that China “opposed” but was “not afraid” of Soviet potential aggression, 
although Kissinger never fully trusted his remarks. 
With the United States appeasing Soviet hegemonic ambitions, Mao initiated a 
domestic campaign for war preparation, mobilizing the masses to “dig tunnels deep, store 
grains everywhere, and never seek hegemony.” Since Mao first announced this plan in 
December 1972,73 the Chinese people constructed large-scale underground tunnels with 
manpower and exhibited them to foreign guests as a sign of their determination to prepare 
for a war following the collapse of superpower détente. “Dig tunnels deep, store grains 
everywhere, and never seek hegemony” was, therefore, a domestic derivative of Mao’s 
global strategy, underscored by the Three Worlds Theory. Shanghai Public 
Transportation Company’s Construction Reception Office wrote a revealing report in 
October 1975 on its mission to show construction sites of underground tunnels to foreign 
guests. In receiving twenty-eight foreign groups from twenty-two countries, the office 
“promoted ‘dig tunnels deep,’ Chairman Mao’s great thoughts on strategic idea and 
people’s war.” The report claimed that the propaganda inspired foreign guests from the 
Third World to “reinforce their anti-imperial, anti-colonial, and anti-hegemonic belief” 
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and from the Second World to “unite the majority and isolate the two hegemons.”74 
Opposition to superpower détente and consequential war, therefore, enabled Mao to 
maintain China’s revolutionary quality at home. 
The strategic discord overshadowed the tactical side of normalization negotiations, 
namely the Taiwan question, which Kissinger continued to assume a “relatively minor 
internal Chinese dispute.”75 In November 1973, he shared with Zhou his tentative plan to 
withdraw U.S. forces from Taiwan and normalize relations with Beijing without severing 
the diplomatic relations with Taipei, if they could find “a formula” consistent with the 
One-China Principle.76 However, this idea proved unrealistic in April 1974, when Deng 
asserted that normalization was possible only “on the basis of the Japanese pattern,” that 
is, cutting off diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Responding to the vice premier’s 
insistence on the Japan model, Kissinger suggested an alternative plan in November to 
have an embassy in Beijing and a liaison office in Taipei. Deng, however, answered that 
his “imaginations” were “still a variation of one China and one Taiwan,” as a Taiwan 
liaison office would symbolize its political representation. He thus declared that time was 
“not ripe yet to solve this [Taiwan] question,” because there was “quite a distance 
between our two sides.” In addition, Deng unveiled the three principles for 
                                                
74 “Renzhen zuohao waibing jiedai gongzuo, xuanchuan Mao zhuxi weida zhanlue xixiang,” B120-3-
68-3， Shanghai Municipal Archive. 
75 Kissinger, White House Years, 1062. 
76 FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVIII, Document 56. For China’s internal debates on the Taiwan issue, see 
Tyler, A Great Wall, 1967-74. The One-China Principle referred to China’s insistence that there was 
only one China and Taiwan was part of China. 
 28 
 
normalization—abolishing the U.S.-Taiwan defense treaty, withdrawing U.S. troops from 
Taiwan, and severing diplomatic relations with Taiwan—which would stifle Sino-
American relations in the following years.77 Despite the apparent deadlock, Ford could 
not possibly take a political risk on the Taiwan question in the face of mounting pressures 
at home and abroad in early 1975. U.S. global posture deteriorated because of the fall of 
the Saigon regime in Vietnam, the demise of the Khmer Republic in Cambodia, and the 
intensifying civil war in Angola, while conservative Republicans staged political attacks 
on the administration, resulting in the removal of several moderate Republicans from the 
cabinet in November. 78  Instead of compromising on China’s three principles, the 
vulnerable president had to “reaffirm our commitments to Taiwan” in a press 
conference.79  
Normalization thus remained out of sight in mid-1975, when the second 
presidential visit was approaching in December. This compelled U.S. policymakers to 
reconsider their negotiation objectives. Senior staff in the State Department and the NSC 
crafted a joint memorandum in July, which admitted that the Chinese “may not want to 
move on normalization at this time” and instead suggested a “sustaining” summit to 
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preserve the momentum, however limited, for normalization.80 Kissinger also showed 
pessimism in discussing the memorandum with its authors. “We’re better off saying we 
don’t think we’re quite ready,” he observed, “I see no flexibility on Taiwan.”81 However, 
U.S. policymakers still upheld their premise that China’s fear the Soviet Union 
underpinned Sino-American relations. The joint memorandum discussed how 
Washington could assure Beijing of the validity of its assessment of Soviet belligerence 
in Asia. Kissinger also believed that the bilateral relationship was still “based on their 
fear of the Russians.” Even after Deng denounced détente in October, he still defended 
the triangular diplomacy in asserting to Ford, “Good relations with the Soviet Union are 
the best for our Chinese relations—and vice versa.” 82  China’s accusation of U.S. 
appeasement was, Kissinger argued, “a disagreement over tactics rather than any 
difference in our fundamental assessment of the primary threat to the national security of 
either of our countries.” He attributed “the degree of pressure they [the Chinese] feel 
under from Moscow” and “their estimate of our ability to act as a world power—
especially against the Russians,” along with U.S. determination for normalization, to 
Beijing’s attitude toward Washington.83 “I think we should tell the Chinese I am going to 
Moscow,” he told Ford before his December visit, “The Soviet angle is what keeps the 
Chinese under control.”84 Kissinger, therefore, held to his triangular strategy, however 
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stalemated it proved to be. Normalization became practically impossible prior to Ford’s 
election defeat, as China also entered an uncertain period of leadership transition in early 
1976. 
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Chapter 5: Brzezinski’s Bilateral Strategy 
Brzezinski’s global strategy had already matured before joining the Carter 
Administration. As a political scientist at Columbia, he endorsed Nixon and Kissinger’s 
China policy in the rapprochement stage for its impact on the Soviet Union, despite his 
criticisms on their neglect of Asian and European allies. However, his concept of “the 
global equilibrium” differed from that of his former academic rival at Harvard. Unlike 
Kissinger’s vision of the multipolar world, “the world is, and is likely to remain, a bipolar 
one,” with middle powers, including China, Europe, and Japan, affecting their power 
balance, due to overwhelming economic and military power of the superpowers.85 As 
Sino-American relations encountered a long stalemate after Nixon’s trip, Brzezinski 
criticized U.S. inaction to widen the bilateral relationship for fear of endangering détente. 
He even advocated strengthening China by providing military technology to improve the 
strategic position of Washington against Moscow.86 While Kissinger’s triangular strategy 
tried to race Moscow and Beijing toward Washington, Brzezinski envisioned a bilateral 
strategy for competition with the Soviet Union, where China played a significant role. 
When he came to office in January 1977, one of Brzezinski’s primary concerns was “to 
improve America’s strategic position” “primarily in relationship to the Soviet Union,” 
which he perceived to be expanding its global influence with military buildup. “An 
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improvement in the U.S.-Chinese relationship” would thus serve “the strategic interest of 
the United States.”87 
Determined to expedite the development of Sino-American relations, Brzezinski 
advocated rapid moves toward normalization from early on, although other issues, 
especially the Panama Canal Treaty, occupied U.S. diplomacy in the first months of the 
Carter administration. He argued in June 1977 that among various measures to improve 
the bilateral relations, “addressing the Taiwan issue first (though not necessarily solving 
it immediately)” was “the best sequence.”88 Brzezinski clarified his rationale for early 
normalization in July, when he explained to Carter “the plain fact” that “our parallel 
strategic interests against the Soviet Union, not bilateral interests, provide the impetus to 
our relationship with China.”89 In addition, the Presidential Directive 18, entitled “US 
National Strategy,” reflected his strategic view on the world. It envisioned that “in the 
foreseeable future,” the superpower relations would “continue to be characterized by both 
competition and cooperation.” PD-18 recommended that while seeking arms control, the 
United States should maintain strong global posture politically, economically, and 
militarily to “counterbalance” “Soviet military power and adverse influence in key areas, 
particularly Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia.”90 Brzezinski strengthened his 
advocacy for countering the Soviet Union by normalization with China in late 1977 to 
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early 1978, when Moscow intensified its anti-U.S. activities in the Horn of Africa. He 
insisted on restoring “reciprocity” in the superpower relationship, as opposed to “SALT 
without linkage,” which referred to Kissinger and Vance’s policy to separate détente 
from Soviet adventurism in the Third World.91 “Timing of normalization [with China],” 
Brzezinski thus later recollected, “was definitely influenced by the Soviet dimension” 
because it would be “valuable in helping Moscow understand the value of restraint and 
reciprocity” in global affairs.92 
Brzezinski’s push for an early normalization caused internal controversies in the 
Carter administration, especially for his relationship with Vance. As Walker pointed out, 
Vance, to be accurate, advocated normalization with Beijing as “highly desirable” for 
“our strategic position,” contrary to his prevalent portrait as an opponent to Brzezinski’s 
China initiative. He nonetheless feared that using the China card to threaten Moscow 
would embolden the Russians and destroy détente. Vance thus conceived of a new 
relationship with China as “friends and not allies.”93 In order to replace Vance’s prudent 
approach with his bold approach, Brzezinski started to request his own visit to China in 
late 1977. He explicitly demanded it from Carter in his weekly report in February 1978. 
He pointed out that because of “Chinese rigidity” and U.S. “excessive sensitivity to the 
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Soviets,” the United States had “slighted the Chinese connection.” Nevertheless, it should 
now cultivate “the consultative relationship—resting quite frankly on a shared concern 
over Soviet aggressiveness.” Brzezinski then asked the president to send him to China “to 
engage in quiet consultations” on strategic issues, “thereby also sending a signal to the 
Soviets which might prove helpful on such matters as the Horn or SALT.”94 
Brzezinski’s bilateral strategy obtained support in the administration in early 1978. 
For example, Chief of U.S. Liaison Office Leonard Woodcock, who expressed his 
willingness to receive Brzezinski in Beijing, concurred with him on the necessity to give 
a higher priority to “the global-strategic” tie with China and criticized the lack of formal 
relations as “founded on an obvious absurdity”95 Secretary of Defense Harold Brown also 
advocated Brzezinski’s visit as a response to the lack of Soviet reciprocity in détente, 
calling for U.S. preparedness to “upset the Soviets as much as they have upset us by their 
actions in the Horn.”96 Most important, Carter himself tilted toward a harder approach 
toward Moscow. In fact, he supported Brzezinski’s forthcoming approach toward 
normalization even prior to Vance’s trip in August 1977. He told his top advisers in July, 
“My own inclination is to be bold about it. My experience in life has been that it never 
pays to procrastinate... Let’s get our ducks in a row ad get it over with.” Carter 
nonetheless opposed to Kissinger’s approach to “knock the Soviets” in negotiations with 
China and preferred a sincere bilateral dialogue based on mutual candor. He thus 
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instructed Vance to adhere to U.S. principles during his visit to China, such as Taiwan’s 
security, arguing that he could “afford to be patient.”97 Carter also kept distance from 
Brzezinski’s bilateral strategy, as evident in his clear rejection of transfer of military 
technology to and preferential trade treatment of China.98 Nevertheless, an impasse in 
SALT and Soviet activities in Africa did harden his attitude toward Moscow. His speech 
at Wake Forest University in March 1978 emphasized U.S. military capabilities to match 
up with the Soviet Union and insisted that détente must be “comprehensive” and 
“reciprocal.”99 As a result, not only did Carter authorize Brzezinski’s trip to China in 
March but also approve the initiation of normalization negotiations via Woodcock in 
summer. 
Brzezinski saw his trip in May 1978 as an opportunity to restore momentum for 
normalization based on his bilateral strategy. He began the negotiation with the Chinese 
by declaring that Washington “has made up its mind” on normalization. He emphasized 
the “complementary interests in insuring the world is free of hegemony” to persuade the 
Chinese to “cooperate again [as in WWII] in the face of the common threat for one of the 
central features of our era is the emergence of the Soviet Union as a global power.” 
Rejecting the Chinese categorization of the United States as a hegemonic power on par 
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with the Soviet Union as “wrong,” he provided detailed briefing on U.S. global strategy 
to show its will and ability to counter Soviet political and military expansion.100 As 
discussed later, the Chinese, especially Foreign Minister Huang Hua, by and large 
expressed doubts about Brzezinski’s bilateral worldview; instead, they warned that 
continuing “appeasement” of Moscow while using Beijing as “a pawn” in SALT 
negotiations would prove unsuccessful. However, he did confirm that Washington and 
Beijing shared “the strategic interests” in cooperating “to cope with the Polar Bear.” 
Brzezinski thus responded to Huang’s criticisms that in spite of tactical disagreements, he 
was “struck” that “the fundamentals of our relationship and the fundamentals of our 
worldview” were, “in large measure, of agreement.”101 Reporting his China visit to Carter, 
Brzezinski underplayed disagreements and overstated common viewpoints. He 
maintained that Chinese “were more relaxed about American resolve vis-à-vis the Soviets” 
than before and did not “lecture us” and “scorn our weakness.” Although U.S. ability to 
change China’s worldview, especially its mistrust in détente, was “likely to prove only 
partially effective,” their “hostility toward the Soviet Union” provided a common ground 
for cooperation.102 
Affirming Sino-American strategic commonality, albeit magnified by 
Brzezinski’s confirmation bias, Taiwan remained the tactical focus for normalization 
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negotiations. He emphasized the importance of a public statement on a peaceful 
resolution for U.S. domestic purposes, while the Chinese rejected a public pledge. Deng 
did mention that it was “quite all right” that Washington would express its hope for a 
peaceful resolution, but added that it “should not make it a precondition” and Beijing 
would state its view that the Taiwan question was its internal affairs. Chairman Hua 
Guofeng, Mao’s successor, also refused to make a commitment to a peaceful resolution 
because doing so “is still the creation of one China, one Taiwan, or two Chinas.”103 
Blinded by his confirmation bias again, Brzezinski nonetheless misinterpreted Deng and 
Hua’s remarks and reached a misinformed conclusion that China would tolerate U.S. 
arms sales to Taiwan as a quid pro quo for its rejection of assurance for peaceful 
settlement.104 Brzezinski thus reported to Carter that the Chinese offered two choices—
“either to continue arms sales to Taiwan after normalization without receiving a Chinese 
statement indicating their intent to resolve the Taiwan issue peacefully, or no further U.S. 
arms sales coupled with a Chinese declaration of peaceful intent.”105 In the face of 
Chinese apparent reluctance on a peaceful resolution, continuous arms sales to Taiwan 
remained the only practical choice. Although his assumptions were biased toward the 
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bilateral strategy, Brzezinski’s determination for Sino-American cooperation, therefore, 
pushed momentum for normalization,  
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Chapter 6: Deng’s Reformist Strategy 
With the historical mission to make China “strong and rich,” Deng Xiaoping 
sought to transform Mao’s China into a new country, whose national interest lied not in 
revolution but in modernization and internationalization.106  In his memoir, Foreign 
Minister Huang Hua analyzed Deng’s diplomatic thoughts, which served as a de facto 
anti-Maoist manifesto. First, Deng presumed that a world war resulting from Soviet 
aggression after the fall of détente was “not inevitable.” Based on the assumption that 
“peace and development” were “the two main trends in today’s world,” he shifted 
China’s focus from war preparation to reform movements widely known as gaige kaifang. 
Second, contrary to Mao, Deng criticized “self-isolation” as “no good” for “development 
of a country” and strived to obtain “foreign assistance” while maintaining “self-reliance” 
where possible. Third, he redirected Chinese antipathy from superpower hegemonic 
competition to Soviet unilateral belligerence. “As international situations changed” due to 
Soviet worldwide expansion, especially in Southeast Asia, “our relations with the U.S. 
gradually improved,” precipitating a decisive tilt through normalization.107 Although 
Huang argued that Deng inherited the Maoist thoughts, his diplomatic philosophy, in 
reality, contradicted Mao’s revolutionary ideals. 
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Deng’s pursuit for modernization and internationalization started before his third 
purge. In April 1975, he lamented to U.S. House Speaker Carl Albert and House 
Republican Leader John Rhodes that China remained “very under-developed.” To reach 
“a relatively developed standard at the end of the 20th century,” he envisioned, “China 
needs a peaceful international environment to build our country.”108 Deng reiterated to 
another U.S. congressional delegation in August that the Chinese “do not want a war” 
because it needed “a good international environment to develop itself.”109 Furthermore, in 
January 1976, he told visiting U.S. female congressmen his hope that “there is a good 
international relations in the next hundred years, which would enable us to establish our 
country.”110 On the basis of a peaceful international environment, Deng advocated foreign 
technology import to achieve modernization. Upon his restoration as a standing member 
of the politburo in July 1977, Deng began emphasizing foreign technology as a 
foundation for the Four Modernizations,111 naming his policy “borrowing the West” as 
opposed to the Gang of Four’s allegation as “worshiping the West” or “crawling to the 
West.”112 He declared at the National Political Consultative Conference in March 1978 
that China had entered “a new developmental era,” where its “revolutionary united front” 
should achieve “the great march toward the Four Modernizations,” “an unprecedented 
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great project and a very far-reaching revolution” in Chinese history.113 Moreover, Deng 
defended the Four Modernizations as compatible with China’s long-term emphasis on 
self-reliance, when he maintained at the National Science Conference in March that 
although China should maintain “independent spirit and self-reliance,” “independent 
spirit is not self-isolation, and self-reliance is not blind exclusion.” Since scientific 
technology is “the humanity’s shared asset,” “any race or nation” should learn “modern 
scientific technology of others.”114 A peaceful environment and the Four Modernization, 
therefore, underpinned Deng’s vision for new China. 
Deng’s reformism, however, confronted Chairman Hua’s vision, which copied 
Mao’s revolutionary ideals. Since his political legitimacy hinged solely on Mao’s short 
handwritten note prior to this death, “If you manage, I am relieved,” the new chairman 
promised to maintain his predecessor’s policy.115 In his first meetings with regional 
leaders in October 1976, Hua expressed his intention to “manage based on the past 
directions,” namely Mao’s teachings, including support for the Cultural Revolution.116 In 
February 1977, an article entitled “Study the Documents and Grasp the Main Points” 
further revealed Hua’s loyalty to Maoism, most clearly shown in his Two Whatevers 
thesis. Connecting Mao’s arguments on class contradictions, criticisms on the Gang of 
Four, and warning against war with imperialism and social imperialism, Hua declared to 
respect “whatever policy Chairman Mao decided” and “whatever instruction Chairman 
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Mao made.”117 He further supported Mao’s legacy in his political report at the Eleventh 
National Congress in August, in which he asserted that “stability and unity” did not mean 
that China “no longer needs class struggle,” because “continuous revolution under the 
proletariat dictatorship” persisted even after the victory in “the first” Cultural Revolution 
against the Gang of Four. As long as class struggle exists, China should repeat “big 
political revolutions” as instructed by Mao. Hua, in essence, pledged to continue the 
Maoist struggle to eradicate “capitalists and capitalism” until establishing the true 
“communism.”118 
Hua also set Mao’s revolutionary worldview, most notably the Three World 
Theory, as the guiding principle for his foreign policy. He declared in the Eleventh 
National Congress, “As factors for revolution continuously increase, factors for war also 
clearly increased.” He also pointed out the “unalterable” fact that “they [the Soviet 
Union] seek advantage everywhere, while the U.S. has vested interests to protect,” which 
made a war “inevitable.” In denouncing détente, he warned against “carry a stone and 
drop it on feet,” an analogy for alleged U.S. attempts to direct “the new czar” eastward, 
only expediting the outbreak of war. Hua also reemphasized “dig tunnels deep, store 
grains everywhere, and never seek hegemony,” Mao’s slogan for uniting the Third World 
for war preparation. He pledged to implement “Chairman Mao’s revolutionary diplomatic 
line” by reinforcing “our alliance with the world’s proletariats, oppressed peoples, and 
Third World countries” to “form a widest united front against U.S. and Soviet 
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superpower hegemony.”119 Hua also told Brzezinski in May 1978 that since “no drastic 
change” occurred in the world situations, “our views” that it was “impossible to avoid the 
war entirely” would “remain the same.” As “revolutionary optimists,” the Chinese, he 
insisted, would “make preparations” for war, “upset the strategic deployment of Soviet 
aggression,” and “call the attention of the world’s people to the danger of the Soviet 
Union launching a war of aggression.” 120  Hua’s strategy for revolutionary China, 
therefore, clashed with Deng’s strategy for reformist China. 
Deng began his political campaign against the Two Whatevers soon after its 
announcement, though only among his political allies until mid-1978. He pointed out to 
Wang Zhen in May 1977 that the Two Whatevers contradicted Maoism. Maoism, he 
insisted, was “a system of thought” to “study and apply” to the changing situations, 
instead of a fixed dogma.121 Deng initiated his public dissent in May 1978, when he 
published an article entitled “Practice is the Only Standard to Examine the Truth.” Citing 
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Mao’s words as Hua did, he argued that theories, including Maoism, “should constantly 
undergo reexamination through practice” because “integration of theory and practice” 
was “Marxism’s only basic principle.” He emphasized Mao’s constant efforts to revise 
“what proved to be mistaken or contradict with the reality.”122  Furthermore, Deng 
claimed at the PLA’s National Conference in June that “seek truth from facts (shishi 
qiushi)” was “Maoism’s origin and fundamental” and “Marxism’s living soul.” Theories 
separate from the reality would deteriorate into “dogmatism and metaphysics,” 
precipitating “a failure of revolution.” 123  Deng, therefore, justified his Four 
Modernization as a Maoist policy in the new era of development and criticized Hua’s 
Two Whatevers for its neglect of the practical reality. 
His ambition for transforming Mao’s China motivated Deng to shift the focus of 
its foreign policy. First, Deng replaced revolution with development as the focal point of 
his talks with delegations from the Third World, although refraining from openly 
contradicting the Three World Theory. He told a Yugoslavian delegation in April 1978 
that China would strive to “achieve the Four Modernizations by the end of the 20th 
century and make our science and technology closer to the world’s modern standard.”124 
“Scientific technology itself does not have class nature,” he pointed out to a Malagasy 
delegation in May, “so we should make all modern technology and modern achievements 
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in the world as the starting point of our development.”125 Deng further emphasized to an 
Algerian presidential emissary in May that the Third World should “unite together and 
use the time acquired for development.”126 He also assured Rwandan President Juvénal 
Habyarimana in June that China could “assume more internationalist missions,” 
especially its “responsibility to the Third World,” only after “developing itself.”127 
Moreover, Deng insisted to Rumanian Ambassador Nicolae Gavrilescu that with 
technology and capital of developed countries, China should “accelerate the speed of 
development” to demonstrate “socialism’s superiority” to capitalism through 
“development of production and enhancement of civilian lives.” He concluded that to do 
otherwise would mean an “empty politics.”128 Thus, development, not revolution, came to 
dominate Deng’s discourse on the Third World. 
Second, Deng emphasized strategic concurrence with the United States from the 
viewpoint of economic and geopolitical realism. Economically, he connected, albeit 
subtly, Sino-American normalization to the Four Modernization. He expressed his wish 
to “import modern technology and experience around the world” to Henry Jackson in 
February 1978. “If Sino-American relations normalize early,” he hypothesized, “our trade 
can develop faster.”129 He also told U.S. reporters at United Press International in May 
that China was “prepare to absorb the world’s modern technology, including from the 
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United States,” which would “facilitate bilateral relations to develop and contribute to 
normalization.”130 Deng further revealed his interest in U.S. technology in his talk with a 
U.S. scientific delegation led by Frank Press, Carter’s science and technology adviser, in 
July. “We hope to absorb your technology,” he frankly opined, “We should now learn 
from developed countries, including you.”131 Although the lack of diplomatic relationship 
inhibited full economic cooperation, Deng thus regarded normalization with the Untied 
States as a key for his Four Modernizations. Geopolitically, he underscored 
commonalities and underplayed disagreements in the bilateral relationship. To be sure, 
Deng opposed U.S. appeasement of Soviet global aggression, which he claimed further 
emboldened the “polar bear.” However, unlike Mao and Hua, Deng’s hostility toward the 
Soviet Union led him to embrace a strategic alliance with the Untied States, instead of a 
revolutionary struggle against both superpowers. He observed to Vance that Beijing and 
Washington had “quite a few points in common” in “global strategy,” namely the shared 
interest in containing Moscow.132 Denouncing the Soviet Union for “using China as a 
pawn in order to gain ore thing from the U.S.,” he also insisted to Brzezinski that 
normalization would create “a difference in strength” in “our efforts to cope with the 
polar bear.”133 Although his demands on the Taiwan issue showed the same rigidity as the 
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official line, which refused to offer any guarantee for a peaceful resolution,134 it remained 
a tactical issue for Deng, whereas opposition to the Soviet Union provided the 
geopolitical background for Sino-American normalization. He thus told Brzezinski in that 
if Carter “made up his mind” to abide by the three principles, Beijing and Washington 
could “sign the document on normalization at any time.” Brzezinski’s bilateral strategy 
and Deng’s reformist strategy, therefore, concurred on the strategic interest in Sino-
American normalization, thereby finally setting normalization negotiations in motion. 
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Chapter 7: Brzezinski-Deng Breakthrough 
The six months from Brzezinski’s visit in May 1978 and the signing of 
normalization in December saw a growing strategic alignment between the United States 
and China, as Deng replaced Hua as China’s de facto leader. Michel Oksenberg, an East 
Asia specialist at NSC, played an instrumental role in crafting U.S. policy to facilitate 
Deng’s political ascendancy. A keen observer of Chinese politics and diplomacy at the 
University of Michigan, he pointed out in the wake of Kissinger’s secret visit in 1971 that 
China’s changing policy toward the United States was “embodiments or representatives 
of various social interests in China,” especially the political swings between those against 
the West and those receptive to the West.135 In early 1975, as uncertainties about Chinese 
domestic politics and foreign policy increased, he identified “institutional legacies of the 
Cultural Revolution” as one of the most contentious issues for the post-Mao leadership.136 
When he came into office, Oksenberg saw a chance that U.S. cooperative policy toward 
China could empower the pro-Western, anti-Cultural Revolution group in China, 
especially Deng, in their struggle against the anti-Western, pro-Cultural Revolution 
faction. As normalization negotiations temporarily stalled in August 1978, he thus called 
Brzezinski and Carter’s attention to Deng’s “anti-Maoist” policies, including his purge of 
Lin Biao-sympathizers in the military and abrogation of the Sino-Soviet treaty, contrary 
to Hua’s stress on “the Maoist heritage.” Deng’s “bold leadership” to set China on “a less 
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easily reversible course” away from Maoism, he also pointed out, left him “in an exposed 
position,” which necessitated Deng to achieve “some easy, generally noncontroversial 
victories” in foreign policy to bolster his political legitimacy. Deng would thus “wrap 
flexibility in rhetoric” in negotiations with the United States.137 Oksenberg also analyzed 
China’s strategy to “build a durable, world-wide anti-Soviet consensus.” The Chinese, he 
observed, “nailed the coffin shut” for the Russians and turned to the West for “hectic” 
modernization and “rapid abandonment of Maoist principles.” China was “leaning to one 
side again—this time our side,” he concluded.138 In November, Oksenberg further urged 
Brzezinski to use U.S. influence on Chinese domestic politics in favor of Deng, as he 
initiated attacks on Hua’s allies, most notably Wang Dongxing. Deng threw “many balls 
in the air” but could not “drop any of them” due to his political vulnerability. Oksenberg, 
therefore, maintained that Washington ensure that Deng “should win” through a series of 
pro-Deng policies, which would culminate in normalization.139 
Concurring with Oksenberg’s advice, Brzezinski promoted a strategic alliance 
with China to assist the rise of Deng. Besides high-level economic and technological 
delegations to China,140 U.S. decision to take distance from Vietnam contributed to the 
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growing momentum for normalization. In late 1978, Vietnam amassed military pressure 
on Cambodia and accepted a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union, 
alienating its former Chinese ally.141 In his NSC Weekly Report in July, Brzezinski 
criticized the initiative for normalization with Hanoi for coming “at the wrong time and 
in the wrong context.” “You need to choose,” he insisted to Carter, “Vietnam or China.” 
He recommended postponing the normalization because China was “incomparably more 
important to us.”142 The Carter Administration, however, was divided on this issue, with 
Carter and Vance in support of normalization. “Guilt feelings over the Vietnamese war,” 
Brzezinski observed in October, caused “the evident desire of Cy and Holbrooke to move 
on this issue rapidly.” Carter nonetheless insisted, “I don’t have guilt feelings & I want to 
move re VNam,” and even reprimanded Brzezinski, “Zbig—You have a tendency to exalt 
the PRC issue.”143 Nevertheless, China’s emphatic warning on the Vietnam issue soon 
changed Carter’s opinion. Huang Zhen asserted in October that Vietnam “hired itself out 
to the Soviet Union” to obtain “regional hegemony,” while the Soviet Union “exploited 
the ambitions of Vietnam to realize its aggression.” “Giving economic aid to Vietnam 
means supporting the Soviet Union,” he insisted, “It is better to let the Soviet Union 
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shoulder the Vietnam burden.”144 In November, CIA Director Stansfield Turner also 
pointed out China’s growing opposition to U.S. attempts to “draw Vietnam economically 
or politically away from the USSR,” which it concluded as “no use.” “Disappointment 
over US normalization with Vietnam at this time,” he warned, “could provide 
ammunition to those in China who might eventually oppose China’s opening to the 
US.”145 Faced with the necessity to maintain the strategic alignment with China, Carter, 
therefore, decided to delay normalization with Vietnam. 
Deng reciprocated U.S. efforts by further promoting the Four Modernizations at 
home and abroad. Domestically, he utilized large-scale conferences for political 
campaigns for his reformist agendas. Deng pointed out at the All China Federation of 
Trade Unions in October that the Four Modernization was “a great revolution” to 
“fundamentally change our country’s economic and technological backwardness” and 
“further reinforce the proletariat dictatorship.” He encouraged the audience to make “the 
maximum efforts” to obtain “technological and managerial knowledge for modernization” 
in order to make “exceptional contribution” to China’s reform.146 In addition, Deng 
proposed to abandon any blind pursuit of static dogmas and initiate new practices for the 
dynamic reality at the Central Work Committee in December. “Revolutionary spirit is 
very precious,” he maintained, “but revolution occurs on the basis of material interest.” 
Exclusive emphasis on “the spirit of sacrifice, not material interest,” meant not revolution 
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but “spiritualism.” Deng also pointed out that although Mao’s revolutionary 
achievements “could never disappear,” he was “not free from shortcomings.” He called 
for an investigation of the Cultural Revolution from the viewpoint of “scientific history,” 
contradicting Hua’s attitude of full endorsement.147 Internationally, the biggest success 
came in October, when Deng visited Japan following the signing of the Sino-Japanese 
Peace and Friendship Treaty.148 He envisioned to Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo, “the 
more we develop, the greater the possibility for cooperation with your country,” and 
expressed his hope for the impact of the treaty to “exceed our initial expectations.” 
Extolling the anti-hegemony clause in the joint statement targeted at the Soviet Union, he 
promised that China would “realize the Four Modernizations, become a strong socialist 
country, and yet never seek hegemony.”149 Furthermore, while in Japan, Deng expressed 
his “hope” to “go to Washington.” While it took “one second” to complete the Peace and 
Friendship Treaty, he reportedly told the Japanese, it would take only “two seconds” for 
Sino-American normalization.150 
Deng’s political rise vis-à-vis Hua culminated in the Third Plenary Session of the 
Eleventh CCP Central Committee in mid-December. While calling the Four 
Modernizations as “one extensive, deep revolution” that would change “production 
relations, managerial methods, and activity and thought methods” that no longer fit the 
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reality, the final statement stopped using “the erroneous slogan” of “taking class struggle 
as the central task” on the ground that “large-scale stormy mass class struggle” should not 
damage “the political situation of stability and unity necessary for socialist modernization 
buildup.” On the historical interpretation of the Cultural Revolution, the statement not 
only denounced the Gang of Four’s attack during the Anti-Deng Campaign and the 
Tiananmen Incident but also cleared criticisms on many purged members, including Peng 
Dehuai,151 confirming their positive contribution to the party. Furthermore, the statement 
negated blind deification of Mao as “not compatible with” the late chairman’s “long-term 
self-evaluation” and concluded that the party leadership should “integrate the universal 
principle of Marxism and Maoism and specific practices of the socialist modernization” 
in accordance with the reality. 152  The statement was tantamount to a tacit yet 
comprehensive criticism on the Two Whatevers, facilitating the quiet leadership 
transition from Hua to Deng without visible confrontations, which Vogel calls 
“succession without coronation.”153 More important, Deng’s rejection of Two Whatevers 
symbolized China’s metamorphosis from a revolutionary nation to a reformist nation. 
Despite the strategic concurrence, the tactical issue of Taiwan nonetheless caused 
disagreements between Washington and Beijing toward the signing of normalization. The 
U.S. side was divided on the problems of a peaceful solution and arms sales. While 
Carter insisted on “no restraints on our trade with Taiwan (not single out arms or any 
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other item)” and advised on “a unilateral (& uncontested) statement” on it, Woodcock 
and Oksenberg regarded it as “extremely difficult” to obtain Chinese “peaceful intent 
toward Taiwan” or its consent to “remain completely silent” to U.S. statements on a 
peaceful solution and arms sales, though still hopeful for tacit tolerance of arms sales.154 
The Chinese validated the latter perspective as the negotiation proceeded. In his 
September meeting with Zhai Zemin, the new chief of the Chinese Liaison Office, Carter 
clarified his intention to retain full economic ties with Taiwan, including “the restrained 
sale of some very carefully selected defensive arms,” in a way that maintained “the 
prospects of peace in the region and the situation surrounding China.” Although 
refraining from demanding an explicit confirmation, he also asked Zhai not to “contradict” 
U.S. statement on a peaceful settlement.155 The Chinese, however, remained adamant. 
Huang criticized Vance in October for trying to “reproduce in a new form the formula 
already rejected by the Chinese side,” which directly or indirectly legitimized Two 
Chinas. “Such a policy of contravening the spirit of the Shanghai Communiqué and of 
interfering in China’s internal affairs,” he asserted, “only shows that you have not yet 
made up our mind to normalize Sino-U.S. relations.”156 
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Disagreements over peaceful settlement and arms sales became even thornier as 
the negotiation approached its target date in December. The Chinese expressed their 
“emphatic objection” to arms sales after normalization and rejected any commitment to 
peaceful settlement as “impossible” due to potential domestic opposition.157 However, 
their guarantee to “refrain from objecting” to U.S. hope for a peaceful solution in the 
joint communiqué kept Brzezinski’s optimism on arms sales alive. “The wording [in their 
objection to arms sales] strongly implies a Chinese acknowledgement that arms sales will 
continue,” he insisted to Carter, “the Chinese ‘object’ but will not let the fact prevent 
normalization.”158 Despite “serious differences” caused by Deng’s protest against any 
arms sales, Woodcock also envisioned that he would do so “within the context of a 
normalized relationship” so as not “fundamentally to affect our relationship.” “We cannot 
agree on the arms sales question,” he concluded, “but we can agree to disagree.”159 The 
United States and China, therefore, finally reached an agreement on normalization on 
December 15. The joint communiqué not only declared the establishment of U.S.-
Chinese relations and the severance of U.S.-Taiwanese relations but also stipulated 
opposition to “efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such 
hegemony,” an apparent allusion to the Soviet Union following the precedence of the 
Shanghai Communiqué. On Taiwan, Washington and Beijing announced respective 
statements, where the former expressed its “interest in the peaceful resolution of the 
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Taiwan issue,” while the latter asserted that it was “entirely China’s internal affair.”160 
Besides the concurrence between Brzezinski’s and Deng’s global strategies, the Sino-
American normalization was, therefore, also predicated upon the delicate mutual 
understanding on Taiwan, which would underpin the bilateral relations for the next 
decades. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion: A Shift in Sino-American Strategic Dynamism 
As discussed, although the Taiwan issue posed tactical difficulties, the changing 
dynamisms between U.S. and Chinese global strategies determined Sino-American 
relations in the 1970s. Kissinger’s triangular strategy of racing Moscow and Beijing for 
better relations with Washington failed to function as envisioned in the face of Mao’s 
revolutionary strategy of championing the Third World in opposition to superpower 
hegemons, creating the long stalemate in the 1970s. Evelyn Goh uses the “discursive 
entrapment” effect to explain Kissinger’s lasting belief in China’s desire for U.S. 
deterrence against the Soviet Union despite contradicting evidence. Once he created the 
discourse on Beijing’s “realist” fear of Moscow, it established a self-reinforcing process 
that underpinned his China policy throughout his tenure.161 To be more accurate, however, 
Kissinger’s persisting assumption of China’s fear was not merely a product of his 
doctrinal inflexibility. He could not reconsider his presumption because it served the 
bedrock for his triangular strategy, which would become dysfunctional if China stopped 
fearing the Soviet Union and desiring U.S. security guarantee. Nevertheless, before 
Ford’s visit, Mao criticized U.S. policy as “using Soviet threat to frighten China, utilizing 
advanced technology and military aid as enticement, and inducing China to serve its 
Soviet policy.”162 His analysis was, to a large extent, correct. The aging chairman thus 
tapped both his shoulders and told Ford, “We see that what you are doing is leaping to 
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Moscow by way of our shoulders, and these shoulders are now useless.”163 Mao’s China, 
in other words, would never serve a stepping-stone in the triangular relationship as 
envisioned by Kissinger. 
To be fair, as Kissinger argued, agitated U.S. domestic politics after the Watergate 
scandal did affect Sino-American relations negatively. The hostile Congress preempted 
U.S. responses to Soviet activities in the Third World and raised the political price for 
compromise on Taiwan, thereby contributing to the Chinese perception of U.S. 
“ineffectualness” as a weak power “with an unelected President facing a hostile 
Congress.”164 However, although Mao never understood U.S. politics behind Nixon’s 
resignation, calling it “nonsensical,” Deng clarified to Kissinger that the Chinese “never 
attached any importance to what you [the Americans] call the Watergate event.” The 
crucial issue was, he maintained, “how we deal with the Soviet Union,” that is, “a 
question of strategy—a question of global strategy.”165 Kissinger attempted to deal with 
Moscow within the framework of his triangular diplomacy, namely by using China as 
leverage for détente, while the Chinese refused it. Despite the paralysis in U.S. domestic 
politics, we should, therefore, still attribute the discord in U.S. and Chinese global 
strategies to their stillborn relationship. 
Brzezinski’s bilateral strategy to forge a de facto alliance with China, on the other 
hand, corresponded with Deng’s reformist strategy of using Sino-American normalization 
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to replace revolution with development in China’s diplomatic priority. Brzezinski’s 
China policy supported his global strategy to compete with the Soviet Union. As the 
bilateral discussions proceeded, he envisioned that “growing collaboration with China” 
would establish “a new framework of stability in the Far East” akin to that in Europe “for 
the first time” after the World War II. U.S. alliance systems in Europe, East Asia, and the 
Middle East would enable the United States to deal with the “Indian Ocean littoral states,” 
“the areas of likely instability and potential conflict” due to Soviet interventions. Sino-
American normalization, Brzezinski concluded, thus contributed to “a more stable U.S.-
Soviet relationship.”166 Normalization, however, would not have been possible without 
the subtle mutual understanding on the Taiwan problem. Nancy Tucker and Enrico 
Fardella attribute Deng’s passion for the Four Modernizations and geopolitical concern 
over Vietnam to his “desperate need for normalization,” as shown in his compromise on 
Taiwan.167 This latter issue did contribute to normalization, which enabled China to 
“teach Vietnamese a lesson” through limited invasion in early 1979 with U.S. 
acquiescence.168 However, more fundamental for Deng’s forthcoming attitude toward 
normalization was his decision to de-revolutionize Chinese diplomacy by abandoning the 
Third World struggle against both superpowers and pursuing development through 
economic cooperation with the West. Due to the strategic context, Deng “opted for 
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movement rather than legalistic quibbling over details,” as Woodcock observed, and 
leave the Taiwan problem unsolved, while not compromising on China’s long-held 
position.169 The shifting dynamisms in Sino-American relations from the Kissinger-Mao 
era to the Brzezinski-Deng era, therefore, facilitated both countries to overcome the long 
impasse and achieve a convergence of national interests on normalization.  
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